This paper demonstrates how simulation of wellbore pressures during different blowout scenarios, borehole stability analysis and solids transport can be applied to the problem of blowout risk assessment. This is a technology area that previously has been overlooked by petroleum geomechanics practitioners. The proposed analysis methodology emphasizes the importance of understanding the transient evolution of the kick within the borehole, as this is a key factor in assessing whether bridging is likely to occur during the events leading up to a blowout. Three representative situations are analyzed and conditions leading to self-killing are reviewed. Analyses of a shallow-gas kick and blowout reproduce the numerous field observations that self-killing is likely from the combination several possible mechanisms -borehole collapse of soft shales, sand erosion leading to cavity collapse in the initially-overpressured aquifer zone, gas depressurization and brine influx. For deeper water scenarios a sudden failure of the marine riser while drilling-ahead is expected to result in conditions where self-killing occurs. The rapid reduction in wellbore hydrostatic pressure following the loss of the riser margin is considered sufficient to initiate borehole failure that causes a cavings-loading that chokes the hydrocarbon influx, so allowing settling of the entrained solids and plugging of the borehole. In contrast, a more slowly-evolving swabbed kick is not expected to be self-killing. Here the slow progression of borehole instability is not expected to impede the increasing kick flow-rate. It is hoped that by presenting these analyses the industry may become better informed of the geomechanical and borehole stability aspects of kicks and blowouts, and that as a consequence well designs in deep-water can become more robust and inherently safer.
Introduction

Motivation for the Work:
In the wake of the 2010 blowout at the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico, Regulators in several areas of the world have introduced more stringent well permitting requirements. As an example, the U.S. Department of Interior Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM, now the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, BSEE) Notice to Lessees (NTL) No. 2010-N06 requires Worst Case Discharge Calculations (WCD) be made for all new well permits [1] . As part of these new regulations it is necessary to consider each hydrocarbon-bearing section that will be drilled as a possible candidate for the Worst Case Discharge Scenario during an uncontrolled flow event. The Notice states that the following information is required:
"Provide a scenario for the potential blowout of the proposed well in your plan or document that you expect will have the highest volume of liquid hydrocarbons. Include the estimated flow rate, total volume, and maximum duration of the potential blowout. Discuss the potential for the well to bridge over, the likelihood for surface intervention to stop the blowout, the availability of a rig to drill a relief well, and rig package constraints. Specify as accurately as possible the time it would take to contract for a rig, move it onsite, and drill a relief well, including the possibility of drilling a relief well from a neighboring platform or an onshore location."
At present, the formal requirements for demonstrating the potential for bridging are not well defined. In its "Guidance for Complying with BOEM NTL No. 2010-N06 on Worst Case Discharge for Offshore Wells" [2] the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) advises that when considering "formation sloughing" the "BOEM guidance is to assume no formation sloughing or hole collapse within the calculation period. Although there is a high likelihood of formation solids production at high rates, the effect of solids production on hole conditions cannot be reliably estimated for most wells. Hole size will be assumed to be constant at the drilled diameter." Immediately following, when discussing "bridging", the document notes:
"If available, mechanical earth models or flux calculations may be used to estimate when an open hole section would collapse and bridge off; however, guidance from the BOEM is that this prediction should be illustrated with nearby and appropriate analogs if this argument will be invoked. If available and appropriate, include a detailed history of the analog event along with core photos and descriptions of the failed intervals, if available."
To address this potential gap in knowledge for predicting bridging a companion paper [3] introduced an analysis to assess borehole stability following a hypothetical blowout in deep water. It considered whether imposed underbalanced conditions could cause sufficient instability that the borehole bridges-over and the well kills itself. At the time of publication (in mid-2011) the proposed analysis was the first in-depth study of transient wellbore instability, solids transport and bridging tendency during a blowout. Analyses were applied to a simplified (but still representative) deep-water blowout scenario. Results indicated that bridging leading to self-killing may occur only in a small number of situations. This conclusion differed from earlier published data from shallow water Gulf of Mexico Shelf wells which show that self-killing is likely to occur in shallow-hazard gas blowout scenarios [4] [5] [6] [7] . In this paper the analysis methodology proposed in SPE 156330 "A Wellbore Stability Approach For Self-Killing Blowout Assessment" is applied to realistic blowout scenarios. To investigate further the potential for self-bridging, additional analyses are now presented using more advanced multiphase flow simulations of kick evolution. These are applied to a wider range of geologic scenarios, applicable to those commonly found when drilling in deep water and coastal shelf areas.
Background:
Uncontrolled influxes of formation fluids into a borehole (a "kick") develop into a blowout when the drilling fluid is fully displaced from the borehole and the formation fluid exits the well. In the case of subsea deep-water wells, the wellhead is at the sea-floor and is connected to the drill rig by a marine riser. Depending upon the integrity of the well and the riser following an event leading to a blowout, hydrocarbon discharge may be at the sea-floor, at the rig floor, or at some point inbetween. An influx of hydrocarbons, especially gas, is more severe than an influx of overpressured water. Occurrences of over-pressured water ("shallow water flows") are well understood from a shallow hazards perspective [8] . Another possible route for hydrocarbons to reach mudline is via an "underground blowout". This occurs when the hydrostatic pressure in the borehole exceeds the fracture gradient of exposed formations. In these circumstances the increased borehole pressure from activating the BOP and killing the flow up the wellbore can cause fracturing of the formation and, depending upon the overburden geology, can result in fractures propagating around the wellbore to seabed. This paper considers two possibilities for the origin of a kick. The first -defined here as a "drilling kick" -occurs when drilling into a permeable formation that has a higher fluid pressure than the hydrostatic pressure of the column of drilling fluid existing within the borehole (i.e. an underbalanced drilling condition exists). The second cause -defined as a "swabbed kick" -can occur when drill pipe movement in a formerly overbalanced situation results in hydrocarbons moving into the wellbore (i.e. plunger-like motion swabbing-in hydrocarbons) that causes the borehole hydrostatic pressure to drop below that of the permeable formation. As a kick develops, the drilling fluid is displaced from the well by the influx of less dense fluids that now have a formation pressure greater than the hydrostatic pressure exerted by the drilling fluid. The bottom-hole pressure in the wellbore thus reduces during the developing kick, thereby accelerating the influx. When all the drilling fluid is displaced from the wellbore a condition of unrestricted open flow occurs (i.e. with a hydrocarbon fluid column to the wellhead), and the blowout continues until terminated by natural causes or external intervention. The natural causes of terminating a blowout include depletion (depressurization) of the formation, water breakthrough (particularly in "shallowhazard" gas blowouts), wellbore collapse, or from bridging at choke-points by produced formation solids entrained in the hydrocarbon flow. The size, productivity and over-pressured nature of many deep-water reservoirs preclude depletion and water breakthrough as being viable self-killing methods within acceptable timescales.
Possible Causes for a Blowout:
The focus for this study is the analysis of blowouts occurring during drilling. Kicks and blowouts occurring during completion, work-over or abandonment operations are outside the scope of this work, as they would be unlikely to involve the possibility of formation failure as a self-killing mechanism. (The prevalence of sand-control completions in deep-water makes it unlikely that significant volumes of formation solids could be produced into the wellbore, even during a kick when running the completion).
Inevitably, for a blowout to occur during drilling operations a number of cascading failures have to happen. These likely will involve both failures of human decision-making and safety equipment. However, this study will not dwell further on the chain of events possibly leading to a blowout. Rather, primary interest is in the flow and pressure changes that occur as the kick develops into a blowout. Scenarios of interest are: (i) flow to the seafloor, occurring via the main-bore of the well; (ii) flow to the rig-floor via the borehole and marine riser; and (iii) an influx of gas while drilling at relatively shallow depth offshore. In cases (i) and (ii) a failure of the blowout preventer (BOP) would be required in order for flow to enter the riser or be discharged to the sea. In case (iii) the time between initial kick and full blowout is usually very short and there may be no mechanism to shut-in the well during this time. In instances such as this, the BOP may be closed and flow diverted via a "diverter line" overboard [9, 10] . Analyses of these three scenarios will be discussed in this paper.
Self-Killing Blowout Analysis Methodology
Paper SPE 156330 [3] introduced a series of interrelated analyses that addressed individual aspects of blowout evolution and whether conditions for bridging and self-killing may occur. Breaking the problem into component parts allowed key assumptions and parametric uncertainties to be easily recognized and investigated. It also permitted use of more sophisticated simulations for certain aspects of the problem where this was considered appropriate. Fully-integrated and coupled numerical simulators may be developed in the future based on the technical requirements identified ahead of time for each problem element. The prediction methodology comprised four major analysis modules: 1) Kick-development analysis: here it is determined how long it takes for the kick to develop into a blowout and how the bottom-hole pressure and in-flow velocity changes during this time.
2) Assessment of borehole collapse: from the bottom-hole pressure variation the potential for wellbore failure in exposed shale and sand formations is assessed. 3) Cavings volume and transport analysis: the time-varying evolution of failure zones surrounding the borehole permit the cavings volume to be calculated. Cavings transport is then assessed, taking into account size and shape of failed material from the borehole wall and knowledge of the fluid velocity profile within the borehole. 4) Cavings bridging analysis: Bridging tendency is assessed from the concentration of cavings and spalled material within the borehole. Alterations or constrictions to flow -such as in regions of enlarged borehole diameter, partially-sheared wellbore tubulars, or other tortuous flow-paths need to be considered as possible locations for particle settling or bridging.
Kick-Development Analysis
When reporting formal estimates of Worst Case Discharge, nodal analysis (or similar) is generally used to calculate inflow and vertical lift performance for the well [11, 12] . In surface blowouts from platform wells, or wells onshore, the blowout rate is typically controlled by a sonic velocity outflow condition as the pressure in the wellbore often exceeds atmospheric pressure. Here a diverter -a large horizontal flow-line from the wellhead -may direct the flow overboard and away from the rig or drill-ship [13, 14, 15] . In seabed blowouts (e.g. when the riser has parted) pressure conditions can be more complex as the well flows against a back-pressure provided by the hydrostatic pressure of the water column at mudline (or where the riser break occurs). In an oil blowout, gas breakout from solution is possible at some point in the wellbore. In a subsea well where the riser has parted this will depend upon the water-depth (i.e. hydrostatic pressure), temperature and the bubble-point of the flowing oil; gas volumes will also be a function of the gas-oil ratio of the fluid.
The required Worst Case Discharge calculations are, however, steady-state conditions of flow from the reservoir. In calculations of bridging tendency it is necessary to model transient multiphase well flow and the evolving bottom-hole pressure variation as the kick develops. The ability to model gas breakout from solution, as well as the large frictional pressure-drops that occur during high-rate multiphase flows, is important in the analysis. Analyses of the dynamic evolution of a blowout event show that substantial changes in bottom-hole pressure can occur over a period of typically 15 minutes to 40 minutes duration as the produced hydrocarbons displace the drilling fluid from the borehole [3, 16, 17] . In analyses presented in this paper, UTPipeFlow™ a hydrodynamic multiphase pipe flow application developed at the University of Texas at Austin is used. This is a multi-disciplinary software for pressure-driven flow of vapor-liquid, liquidliquid, vapor-solid, liquid-solid and vapor-liquid-liquid phase combinations in closed-conduits of any cross-sectional shape. Pressure, friction/hydrostatic/acceleration/deceleration pressure-gradients, volume fraction, shear stress and entrainment fraction are among the multitude of variables that are calculated at any axial location along the conduit. UTPipeFlow™ has been validated against ANNA, the world's largest database of time-averaged pressure and volume fraction measurements (over 74,000 experimental measurements from more than 150 different laboratories, and over 6,000 field observations from primarily the petroleum, chemical and geothermal industries). These independently-verifiable measurements can be easily cross-referenced to publicly-accessible, archival journal publications and university theses, and demonstrate the capability of the software to provide reliably accurate simulation results ranging from micro-channels to very large trunk lines. The working equations in UTPipeFlow™ represent a fundamental change in the understanding and prediction-capability of complex laboratory and field-scale flows. These equations are analytical. The main equation solved in UTPipeFlow™ is its generalized pressure gradient equation, which is valid for both fully-developed and developing multiphase flows. Beyond the usual features provided by multiphase pipe flow simulators (such as best-estimate operations analyses, cost-effective pipeline and component design, detection of hidden risks/opportunities, diagnostic analyses, flow metering and optimization) the unique features of UTPipeFlow™ that were utilized in the present study were its ability to accommodate: (i) non-Newtonian multiphase flow; (ii) contracting/expanding, concentric/eccentric annulus flow paths; (iii) vapor-from-liquid or liquid-fromvapor phase-change in complex fluids; (iv) developing transient flow; (v) high-pressure, high-temperature flow; and (vi) high-rate flow.
Assessment of Borehole Collapse
Of interest here is the possibility for borehole collapse in exposed formations that might lead to plugging or bridging. Conditions leading to wellbore collapse due to a reduction in bottom hole pressure can be illustrated schematically through the use of a Mohr-Coulomb failure diagram, as shown in Figure 1 . As the bottom-hole pressure decreases the Mohr circle shifts to the left, so approaching the failure envelope of the formation. This failure envelope defines the boundary between permissible (i.e. "safe") and inadmissible (i.e. "failed") stress states. With the further decrease in bottom-hole pressure, the Mohr circle contacts the failure envelope and so wellbore instability occurs. In the context of a developing underbalance causing wellbore instability, it is important to note the difference between failure in weak and strong formations. In a weak formation, the attainment of near-balance pressure conditions results in a combined mode of both compressive and tensile failure. This is evidenced when drilling in the field by a mixture of splintery and angular cavings from weak shales -e.g. as might be seen when drilling into a pressure ramp (shown in the lower cavings picture in Fig. 1 ). In contrast, wellbore failure in strong formations is dominated by tensile failure, which is evidenced by predominantly splintery cavings, such as those that might be produced from a highly-overpressured gas well when drilling close-to or just under balanced conditions (left-most cavings picture).
The size of the angular "shear" cavings from weak formations is also larger than the splintery "pore pressure" cavings from strong formations, so making it more difficult for them to be carried to surface.
Wellbore instability in exposed shale formations may be evaluated using conventional time-dependent (poroelastic) analysis [3, 18] . To assess the sand influx from the flowing hydrocarbon-bearing zones prediction methods, such as that proposed by Willson et al. (2002) [19] , may be used. Large reductions in bottom-hole pressure and the resulting high flow rates can result in spalling and borehole collapse in the exposed sandstone. This additional produced material, together with that from the failing shale sections may provide a sufficient volume of material that the borehole flow is impeded and slowed by the weight of the entrained sand such that the borehole bridges and the kick kills itself. However, in the highly overpressured blowout scenario analyzed in SPE 156330 [3] the sand produced with the hydrocarbon flow caused an insignificant increase in the overall fluid column density within the wellbore, and it was concluded that sand influx from prolific deep-water reservoirs cannot be relied upon to stem the progression of the blowout; i.e. bridging will not occur from the contribution of produced sand alone.
Cavings Transport Analysis
As mentioned above, while significant cavings volumes may be generated from the failing borehole wall by the underbalanced conditions generated as a kick develops into a blowout, self-killing may not occur if the flow velocity is sufficient to carry the cavings to surface as they are produced. To address this, a cavings transport analysis is required. An easily implemented analysis -such as that of Chien [20] -may be used. The early-time behavior of the kick development is very crucial to the understanding of whether self-bridging will occur. In particular, the rate of formation collapse following the imposition of underbalanced conditions will dictate whether shale cavings will accumulate in the open borehole section and potentially bridge, or whether the kick influx rate will increase sufficiently so that shale cavings will be produced along with the flow in the wellbore. In lower flow-rate scenarios it is possible that the flow rate may be insufficient, and here cavings settling would occur. In high flow-rate scenarios previous analyses have shown that cavings transport flow velocities would be attained quite early-on in the kick development and that bridging is unlikely [3] , though this may again depend upon the amount and rate of borehole failure occurring.
Cavings Bridging Analysis
Where high flow rates may effectively transport spalled material during the evolution of the kick, bridging may occur if solids concentrations are high enough, particularly in lengths of the flow path where constrictions to flow exist. Similar to heavy traffic on a freeway, high concentrations of solids slow the flow due to the impact that the suspended solids have on the effective fluid viscosity. The effect of suspended solids on viscosity was first studied by Albert Einstein in 1906 [21] , and extensions to Einstein's work by Frankel and Acrivos [22] and Pabst [23] have also proven to be useful in the analysis of this problem.
The fundamental concept involved with cavings bridging is that as the solids concentration, , approaches the critical concentration,  c , the effective viscosity tends to infinity and flow stops. The critical concentration of monodisperse spheres is 0.64 [22] . The critical concentration of irregularly-shaped cavings is lower than this. In the minerals processing literature, critical concentrations of crushed rock slurries (arguably more relevant to cavings transport) indicate critical concentrations of ca. 0.5 are appropriate [24] . A viscosity multiplier, , that takes into consideration the concentration of solid particles can be calculated from established relationships. One such relationship for the viscosity multiplier attributed to Brule and Jongschaap [25] has proven useful for high-concentration slurries: The dynamics of the kick evolution will again dictate whether significant spalling could sufficiently impede its progress (via the effects of increased effective viscosity) such that the cavings are no-longer suspended in the flow, they settle, and so plug the borehole. Here, the timing of the instability relative to the increase in flow rate again becomes important. If failed material remains in-place initially, but collapses suddenly into the borehole then the possibility for bridging to occur will depend upon the prevailing flow rate at the time of instability. It was shown previously [3] that instability occurring during a kick with drill-pipe not present in an 8½-ins. borehole is unlikely to lead to bridging, as flow rates will exceed the cavings settling velocity -even for slowed flow due to the presence of cavings. However, bridging between the borehole wall and drill-pipe is possible by achieving critical solids concentrations in situations where instability occurs with 5½-ins. drill-pipe present in the 8½-ins. borehole.
Scenarios Considered That Might Result in Possible Bridging
Three scenarios are now studied using the "Self-Killing Blowout Analysis Methodology" described above. The first analysis considers the "riser break" scenario that was analyzed in simplified form in SPE 156330 [3] . In this earlier analysis formation oil properties were chosen such that flow in the wellbore remained single phase (i.e. no gas breakout from solution occurred). This assumption is relaxed in new analyses presented here, and gas breakout in the borehole does occur. The second analysis considers a "swabbed kick", where a slow influx of hydrocarbons into the well goes unnoticed, so underbalancing the borehole hydrostatic pressure to the formation. This results in a kick developing up through the borehole and marine riser causing a blowout at the rig-floor.
Here the kick-to-blowout transition is characterized by the rapid expansion of gas exolving from solution in the oil as riser and borehole pressures reduce due to the influx and liberation of less dense hydrocarbon fluids. The third scenario considers a gas kick, typical of that occurring at shallow depth.
Scenario 1 -Structural Failure of the Riser LMRP Gives Rise to a Blowout
In this example, it is assumed that a catastrophic failure of the marine riser occurs at the Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP). Here the loss of the "riser margin" -the pressure difference between the hydrostatic pressure of the mud column in the riser and the water hydrostatic at the seabed -puts exposed sand formations in the borehole into an underbalanced situation such that a kick is initiated that develops into a blowout. Pertinent data used in this analysis are summarized in Table 1 .
For the scenario defined opposite, the UTPipeFlow™ simulator predicts the kick to take approximately 28 minutes to develop into a full blowout. During this time, the bottom-hole flowing pressure (BHFP) reduces from 11,187 psi immediately after the riser failure, to 10,820 psi at the time that hydrocarbons reach the wellhead at the seafloor. At this point the blowout flow-rate is 59,000 bbl/d. Figure 2 shows selective property profiles in the Rotary Fig. 2 the position of the oil/drilling-fluid interface in the borehole is clearly seen. The Superficial Velocity plot distinguishes between liquid (oil and drilling-fluid) and gaseous phases in the borehole. In the plots relating to 27 minutes-time, gas is present, breaking out of solution from the hydrocarbon influx towards the upper quarter of the borehole length. An important aspect of this transient flow simulation is seen in the developing pressure gradients in the borehole as the kick flow rate accelerates with the reducing bottom-hole pressure. In Fig. 2 the Pressure Gradient plots show the contributions to total pressure gradient (TPG) arising from the frictional pressure gradient (FPG), the hydrostatic pressure gradient (HPG) and the accelerational (or decelerational) pressure gradient (ADPG). It should be noted that the flow regime evolves from being HPG-dominated to a FPG-dominated one as the oil influx rate increases as more and more mud is evacuated from the borehole. For this reason, estimates of worst-case discharge based solely on bottom-hole pressure calculated from hydrostatic densities (i.e. ignoring frictional effects) will predict flow rates that are larger than would occur in reality should such an event occur. Figure 3 shows the results of a poroelastic wellbore stability analysis of shale formations immediately above the flowing reservoir interval at 17,850 ft.BRT. The analysis accounts for the time-varying pore pressure and stress concentration changes around the borehole as the wellbore pressure is steadily reduced during the kick. The right-hand plots show the formation strength that is required for the borehole to remain stable at the time of the riser failure and when the kick develops into a blowout after 28 minutes. (Relatively high strength exceeding 3500 psi unconfined compressive strength is required for there to be no failure surrounding the borehole in these analyses.) The black contour shows the extent of the failed zone surrounding the borehole for the conditions analyzed. This is defined by the yellow-shaded 1600 psi unconfined compressive strength contour surrounding the 8-ins. borehole. Scaling this contour diameter to the known borehole diameter, the analyses indicate a failed-zone diameter of 10.4-ins. [264mm] is created when the riser fails; this is predicted to enlarge to 10.65-ins.
[271mm] once the kick reaches the wellhead.
Field observations of cavings recovered over the shakers during instability events in deep-water wells are used to estimate the size of cavings that might be produced as the borehole wall fails during the kick development [26] . Figure 4 shows cavings having 1-in. dimension are considered quite typical under these situations. Figure 5 presents settling velocities, calculated using the method of Chien [20] , for cavings produced by the instability in the borehole. Comparing the settling velocity of 1.4 ft./sec [0.76 m/sec] for 1-in. equivalent length cavings with borehole velocities shown in Fig. 2 it is clearly evident that the high flow velocities in the well will assure cavings transport very early-on in the development of the kick.
Having established that cavings will not settle in the flow, it is necessary to investigate whether the spalled cavings will achieve a sufficient concentration that the effective viscosity of the fluid/cavings mixture will increase to such an extent that flow from the borehole will become choked (i.e. reduced) so that setting of the cavings subsequently becomes possible. Fig.  3 has shown that a failed-zone annulus extending from the borehole wall to a diameter of 10.4-ins. [264mm] is created when the riser fails, and that this is predicted to enlarge to 10.65-ins. [271mm] once the kick reaches the wellhead.
If we consider the cross-sectional areas of failed and open borehole in Fig. 3 and assume that at some early time during the kick development the annulus of failed material collapses into the 8-ins. borehole and around the 5-ins. drill-pipe, the annulus of spalled material is equivalent to 28.2-ins 2 (i.e. the area of the 10.4-ins.  8-ins. annulus). The total area available for flow is 61.2 ins 2 (calculated as the annulus between the intact formation wall, 10.4-ins., and drill-pipe). This gives a solid concentration of 0.46, close to the critical concentration of 0.5.
Substituting for the solids and critical concentrations into Eq. 1, a viscosity multiplier of 21.5 is calculated. Fig. 2 shows that as the kick develops, unimpeded flow velocities in the open-hole annulus region are in the range 13 to 16.5 ft./sec [4 to 5 m/sec]. While these are well in excess of the settling velocity of cavings without the cavings being present, the cavings loading from initial borehole failure is predicted to reduce these by a factor of 21.5, to 0.6 to 0.8 ft./sec. Referring to Fig. 5 , this would indicate that any cavings larger than 0.3-ins. equivalent length would settle in the flow. Thus, for this analysis, provided that the instability occurs while drill-pipe is present in the 8-ins. hole, the cavings-load generated by borehole failure resulting from the sudden reduction in bottom-hole pressure from losing the riser margin is sufficient to cause selfkilling. This is the consequence of spalled material increasing the effective viscosity of the oil/solids mixture that slows the flow-rate and so allows settling to occur.
It should be noted that the relatively high PI of 50 bbl/d/psi used in this analysis is equivalent to a kh product of 50,000 mD.ft. (e.g. 100 ft. thickness of 500 mD sand). Formation PI would have to be reduced by roughly one-fifth (i.e. 100 ft. thickness of 100 mD sand) for flow velocities to be reduced such that settling of cavings would occur, irrespective of concentration. Similarly, attaining a sufficient solids concentration after initial borehole failure will itself be a function of formation strength (i.e. a stronger formation would produce fewer cavings for a given borehole pressure reduction) and water depth (i.e. a larger riser margin loss occurs in deeper water). Thus, the propensity for bridging and cavings settling to occur is very dependent upon the thickness of formations exposed in the borehole, their productivity, formation strength and the magnitude of borehole pressure reduction following a riser break. The "Self-Killing Blowout Analysis Methodology" described here provides a solution framework to assess the interaction of these effects for all practical drilling scenarios. Scenario 2 -"Swabbed Kick" Gives Rise to a Slowly Evolving Blowout Scenario 1 considered above has, as it origin, a catastrophic failure of the marine riser that causes a sudden reduction in borehole hydrostatic pressure to kick-start the hydrocarbon influx into the borehole. An alternative cause for a kick to develop, considered here as Scenario 2, is when movement of the drill-pipe causes a volume of hydrocarbons to be swabbed into the wellbore. (Such movements may be the result of reaming, making a connection, making a short-trip to the shoe, etc.). Here a situation exists where the hydrostatic pressure of the drilling fluid that initially exceeds formation pressure can be brought to an underbalanced flowing condition by the influx of a small volume of lighter hydrocarbons. Because annulus volumes are typically small at depth in the well, a small influx volume can have a considerable effect in reducing the bottomhole hydrostatic pressure. By their origin, swabbed kicks typically take time to develop into a full blow-out, as hydrocarbons have to displace drilling fluid from the borehole and the larger-volume marine riser. As before, speculation of the sequence of events that would allow this influx to go unnoticed at the rig-floor is beyond the scope of this paper.
To analyze the swabbed kick, the basic set of problem parameters defined in Table 1 for Scenario 1 is again used. In Scenario 2, a marine riser having a 19.5-ins. [0.495m] internal diameter is assumed between the seabed and rig-floor (5167-ft.
[1575m] in length. A 100 bbl swabbed kick is assumed which underbalances the borehole and the kick becomes selfsustaining. Simulating this evolving event in UTPipeFlow™ results in a series of snap-shot conditions corresponding to early-, mid-and late-time situations as the hydrocarbons rise in the borehole (Figure 6 ). Overall, this event takes almost two hours (114 minutes) to displace all the drilling fluid from the borehole. The bottom-hole pressure variation over time is shown in Figure 7 . In this example too, the frictional pressure provides a significant resistance to the flow such that simple static calculations of pressure are not applicable.
In terms of borehole pressure and instability, it is interesting to note that the end-point bottom-hole pressure as the kick has risen almost to the rig-floor (11,035 psi) is similar to the starting-point of the Scenario 1 analyses at the time that the riser-break has occurred (11,187 psi) . This suggests that the borehole failure analysis shown in Figure 3 at the time of the riser-break is approximately equivalent to the end-condition for the swabbed kick. It also reasonable to assume that in the slowly-evolving swabbed kick, borehole failure will be progressive and not catastrophic, as in the riser-break scenario. Figure 6 shows that fluid velocities in the borehole -in excess of 3 ft./sec [0.91 m/sec] are sufficient to transport cavings produced from the creation of breakouts. For this reason, therefore, it is concluded that bridging and self-killing is NOT expected in the case of more-slowly evolving swabbed blowouts. 
Scenario 3 -Shallow Gas Blowout
The final scenario considered in this paper is an analysis of a shallow-gas blowout event. Historically, these events have been fairly common when drilling in US Gulf Coast shelf waters [4] [5] [6] [7] 9, 10] . Previous publications have investigated the flow rates and pressures generated during these events, with varying degrees of flow-modeling sophistication [13] [14] [15] [16] . In the analysis reported here, we simulate a gas influx from an overpressured shallow gas pocket that develops into a blowout and which, in turn, is killed by the subsequent influx of formation brine. Figure 8 shows a schematic of the problem considered. Table 2 summarizes pertinent data used in the analysis.
In the analysis it was not possible to fully-couple the gas/aquifer response to the borehole flow response. (This perhaps is a technology development for the future.) Rather, the transient radial gas-flow equation for an infinite reservoir was used to simulate the gas influx phase of the gas kick [14] . At a point in time when the drilling mud is fully evacuated from the borehole it is assumed that the gas cap becomes depleted such that aquifer brine now flows into the borehole. The steadystate radial flow equation is used to predict the brine inflow rate to the well. Brine then rises in the wellbore to a level where the well becomes static. Figure 9 shows the changes in bottom-hole pressure that occur during this process. The gas kick develops over a time period of 400 seconds (just under 7 minutes). The water influx then takes over 100 hrs. (4 days) to kill the well from water influx alone.
This slightly idealized scenario is not unrealistic, however. Skalle et al [5, 6] presented a statistical analysis of killing methods and consequences of blowouts experienced in wells drilled between 1960 and 1996 in Texas (826 wells) and on the US Outer Continental Shelf (OCS, 187 wells). They found that the overwhelming majority of cases (greater than 90%) involved gas or gas and brine, and that two-thirds of blowouts were killed by bridging, depletion or by pumping weighted mud. Over 80% of blowouts reviewed took under 4 days to either self-kill or be brought under control. The conditions analyzed in Scenario 3 are, therefore, considered sufficiently representative of actual field experiences that minor deficiencies in the detailed influx response do not detract from the overall value of the simulation. Figure 10 presents snap-shot profiles of pertinent properties in early-, mid-and late-time situations during the gas influx event into the borehole. Figure 11 presents corresponding data for early-, mid-and late-time situations during the brine influx period.
Fundamentally different flow physics apply during the gas-kick phase of Scenario 3 than were seen in either of Scenarios 1 and 2. Whereas a static mud column was assumed in these previous Scenarios, in Scenario 3 drilling mud continues to circulate at increasingly smaller flow rates during the 400 seconds it takes to fully evacuate the drilling mud from the borehole. This is considered a reasonable time to shut-down the rigpumps after noticing the kick and routing the flow to the overboard diverter. "Piston-like" displacement of the drilling fluid by the gas influx no-longer applies. In fact, it is erroneous to make this assumption, as gas will flow through (or past) the drilling fluid with a velocity that is greater than that of the drilling fluid. Johnson and White [27] provide a detailed review of gas-rise velocities during kicks. They noted that a gas kick will rise faster than the liquid in the wellbore and that some field cases have reported surprisingly fast gas breakouts at surface.
The flow model implemented in UTPipeFlow™ incorporates this gas slippage effect and is able to realistically simulate both the early gas-arrival and eventual gas flow rates from the well.
As the gas kick evolves, Fig. 10 shows how the gas volume fraction in the borehole increases to 100% over 400 seconds as the drilling fluid becomes completely evacuated from the borehole. A bottom-hole pressure of only 210 psi [1,450,000 Pa] exists at this late time as the pressure differential in the wellbore is dominated by the hydrostatic pressure gradient. The instantaneous gas flow rate is estimated at 34.8 MMscf/d at this fully evacuated case.
After full evacuation it is assumed that water influx into the borehole via coning or lateral flow occurs. The more slowly moving water filling the borehole results in a rapid deceleration of the gas flow (from 6 m/sec gas flow at bottom-hole conditions to 0.2 m/sec water flow). After water-breakthrough occurs, the water level rise in the borehole is slow and piston-like as the water displaces the gas. The water level rise in the simulations is clearly seen from the volume fraction curves in Fig. 11 . From the standpoint of self-killing, these analyses clearly show that depletion of the gas pocket or the influx of water is sufficient to stop the continued evolution of the blowout. At this point it is envisioned that pumping a kill-weight brine to restore overbalanced bottom-hole conditions would return the well to a safe operating condition.
Mechanisms have been proposed for borehole instability of the exposed sand-face and weak shale formations during a shallow gas kick [28] -see Figure 12 . The mechanism for sand failure is analogous to the problem of sand-mining that is speculated to occur during shallow-water flow events [8, 29] . A solution approach is presented for each mechanisms in subsequent sections. These show that the early conceptual models for borehole collapse and self-killing occurring during shallow gas blowout events are realistic. The simple analytical approaches presented may be used in similar analyses of blowouts and shallow-water flow events. 
Rotary
Analysis of Sand Erosion and Cavity Collapse
Flow rates from the circulating drilling fluid and the influx of gas are sufficient to transport the fine formation sand from the borehole. (Sand particles sizes are typically less than 250 microns.) The mechanism of sand-face instability is envisioned as an 'avalanche' process whereby the sand face successively mines-back until the slope of the sand face reaches its angle of repose. For practical purposes, the angle of repose is taken to be the angle of friction of the material. The maximum dimension of the top radius of the cavity created is calculated simply from the sand body thickness [10 ft.] divided by the tangent of the angle of repose -i.e. a maximum radius of 14.28 ft. [4.5m] in the scenario considered here. Once the angle of repose is reached it is assumed that further sand production is achieved by sand dilation (i.e. increasing porosity) as a zone of loosened sand migrates away from the producing wellbore.
As the unsupported cavity grows in size the weak shale comprising the 'cap rock' formation immediately above the cavity must respond by supporting the weight of the overburden. There is a maximum size that the cavity can attain without destabilizing the overburden. This depends upon the strength of the overburden and depth of burial.
The mining and soil mechanics literature has several techniques available to assess the stability of analogous problems, e.g. the stability of tunnels, underground excavations and long-wall mining. For illustration purposes here, the simple "trapdoor" problem in soil mechanics can be used to predict the stability of the overburden [30] . A schematic of this collapse problem is shown in Figure 13 . In the analysis the overburden is assumed to be a purely cohesive material, having uniform shear strength, C u . The other loads in the analysis come from the "surcharge",  s , the overburden pressure at the shallow aquifer zone depth. Countering the surcharge pressure there exists a "support pressure",  t , taken to be the bottom-hole flowing pressure in the shallow aquifer.
The stability of the overburden can be assessed by considering a "stability number", N, defined by:
To estimate the average shear strength of the overburden, normalized strength values generated from analogous near-surface Gulf of Mexico deep-watersettings have been used [31] . Using the formation characteristics defined in Table 2 , it is found that a "normalized undrained shear strength" equivalent to 0.24  average vertical effective stress applies. At the shallow aquifer depth the vertical effective stress is 1060 psi and assuming this to increase linearly from mudline to this depth, the average formation undrained shear strength of the overburden is estimated to be 127 psi. (This is equivalent to an average unconfined compressive strength of 488 psi [3. 37 MPa], which is [30] ) quite reasonable for the top 3000 ft. of sediment.) Thus, from Eq. 2, a stability number of 18.0 applies for full erosion of the exposed sand face back to its angle of repose and with a bottom-hole pressure of 210 psi existing in the eroded cavity.
Having established the stability number at any given time in the wellbore, the stability number to prevent collapse must now be calculated. This is a function of the depth/width ratio, H/B, where B is the width of the unsupported cavity. It should be noted that the stability problem described here is for plane strain conditions and not for the axisymmetric case that more appropriately exists around a wellbore. However, a plane strain analysis will give a lower collapse pressure (i.e. smaller dimension cavity) than the radial, axisymmetric case. Notwithstanding this difference, we use this value for assessing collapse in this illustrative example. Lower-bound stability numbers for a "trapdoor" embedded in a saturated homogenous cohesive soil under undrained conditions can be determined from Singh & Basudhar [32] . They found that the stability number required for an opening to remain stable is given by the following regression equation to their data: Thus in the analyses considered here, H/B is equivalent to 105. This gives a limiting stability number of 12.5. Therefore, as the calculated stability number of 18 exceeds the limiting stability number of 12.5, failure of the cap-rock overburden would be expected before full gas-evacuation of the borehole occurs (i.e. before the bottom-hole flowing pressure is reduced to 210 psi). This would result in substantial formation collapse and failure of the borehole. This, in-turn, would lead to packing-off the wellbore conduit and so impeding and choking the influx. This would give rise to a condition where the blowout would be expected to self-kill itself [28] . It is possible to use Equations (2) and (3) with the change in bottom-hole pressure shown in Fig. 9 to estimate conditions where cap-rock integrity starts to fail and the process of self-killing begins. The analysis indicates that unstable conditions are reached at a bottom-hole pressure of 700 psi; this occurs 4 minutes after the kick begins. Sand-mining and cavity collapse -shown schematically in Fig. 12 -is, therefore, considered to be a viable method for self-killing shallow-gas kicks. Figure 12 speculates another mechanism of instability is possible for self-killing. This requires normally-pressured weak shales above the shallow aquifer zone becoming unstable as they are exposed to reducing borehole pressure as gas displaces drilling fluid from the borehole. This mechanism of failure has been the subject of recent research at the Department of Civil Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) [33, 34, 35] . This work uses both experimental [33] and numerical [35] modeling of scaled-borehole collapse tests in strong clays to predict the onset and development of localized plastic failure in these relatively weak materials. This soil mechanics-based approach is considered more appropriate for analyzing the stability of shallow sediments than the quasi-brittle instability analyses that were used to investigate borehole collapse in deeper, more lithified sediments in Scenario 1. (See Crook et al [36] for further discussion of this.) Figure 14 presents a summary of borehole closure and collapse simulations for trajectories of varying deviation in soft rock [35] . Deformations are normalized to the borehole radius and radial effective stresses are normalized to the vertical effective stress, thus making the solutions applicable to all situations where soft-rock behavior applies. Instability in a vertical well, characterized by rapidly increasing borehole deformation, is predicted to occur at a normalized radial stress of -0.3. Referring to Table 2 , if one assumes a vertical total stress of 2,500 psi and a pore pressure of 1340 psi in the soft shale above the aquifer, Fig. 14 indicates that borehole failure will occur at a borehole pressure of 992 psi (i.e. an underbalance of 348 psi). Referring to the variation in bottom-hole pressure shown in Fig. 9 , this underbalanced condition would be reached approximately three minutes after the beginning of the gas kick. Similar to the analyses of sand failure considered above, instability of exposed weak shale formations is expected to occur early-on in the development of the gas kick. In fact, combined instability of both sand and shale may be expected at roughly the same time giving rise to conditions where the wellbore is expected to collapse so preventing the continued development of the kick into a blowout.
Analysis of Borehole Collapse in Weak Shale Formations Above the Shallow Aquifer
Conclusions
The paper emphasizes the need for an integrated and multidisciplinary approach for the analysis of kick events that might lead to a blowout. Transient multiphase flow models are key to understanding the variation in borehole pressures as a simulated kick evolves into a blowout. A four-step analysis approach to the problem has been shown to capture the essential parts of the problem physics: kick-development analysis determines how long it will take for the kick to develop into a blowout, and how the bottom pressure and in-flow velocity changes during this time; analysis of borehole collapse assesses the potential for wellbore failure in exposed shale and sand formations; cavings volume and transport analysis considers the time-varying evolution of the failure zone surrounding the borehole, taking into account the geometry of failed material from the borehole wall; and finally cavings bridging analysis considers the concentration of cavings and spalled material within the borehole and cased portions of the wellbore, taking into account any potential constrictions to flow.
Three representative kick scenarios have been analyzed in detail. A sudden failure of the marine riser while drilling ahead in a deep-water well is expected to result in conditions where self-killing occurs. The rapid reduction in wellbore hydrostatic pressure following the loss of the riser margin is considered sufficient to initiate borehole failure that causes a cavings-loading that chokes the hydrocarbon influx, so allowing settling of the entrained solids and plugging of the borehole.
In contrast, a more slowly-evolving swabbed kick is not expected to be self-killing. Here the slow progression of borehole instability is not expected to impede the increasing kick flow-rate. However, a swabbed kick is of much longer duration and offers more opportunity for intervention to arrest its progression in the borehole. Lastly, analyses of a shallow-gas kick and blowout reproduce the numerous field observations that self-killing is likely. This can occur from the combination several possible mechanisms -borehole collapse of soft shales, sand erosion leading to cavity collapse in the initially-overpressured aquifer zone, gas depressurization and brine influx.
It is hoped that by presenting these ideas and analyses the industry may become better informed of the geomechanical and borehole stability aspects of kicks and blowouts, and that as a consequence well designs in deep-water can become more robust and inherently safer. Vertical, Inclined and Horizontal Wellbores (from Akl [35] )
